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Abstract: Women earn less than men but are not less satisfied with life. This paper 
explores whether norms regarding the appropriate pay for women compared to men 
may explain these findings. In order to capture the spatial variation in such norms, we 
take community level information on citizens’ approval of an equal rights amendment 
to the Swiss constitution as a proxy for the norm that “women and men shall have the 
right to equal pay for work of equal value”. We find that the gender wage gap is 
smaller where a larger fraction of the citizenry has voted in favor of equal pay. We 
also find that employed women are less (not more) satisfied with life in liberal 
communities where the gender wage gap is smaller. These findings are consistent 
with the idea that norms regarding the appropriate relative pay of women compared 
to men are shaping gender differences in well-being. 
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Approval of Equal Rights and Gender Differences in Well-Being 
 
 
 
“The generality of the male sex cannot yet tolerate the  
idea of living with an equal.” 
-- John Stuart Mill (1869) 
 
 
1 Introduction 
It is a well-established statistical finding that women earn less than men on the labor market.1 
Nevertheless, women do not report significantly lower satisfaction with their life or their job 
and, in countries like the United States, Great Britain or Switzerland, they even report higher 
job satisfaction than men.2 This is a puzzle. To the extent that the gender wage gap is thought 
to be due to discrimination that is perceived as such, one would expect women to experience 
lower well-being than men, ceteris paribus. 
This paper explores whether norms regarding appropriate pay of women compared to men 
can account for gender differences in salaries and subjective well-being and thus solve the 
puzzle mentioned above. We do not want to offer a comprehensive theory but we rather argue 
that social norms are one factor that has been understudied. In our framework, social norms 
are internalized and are thus indicative of individual preferences. We follow the argument that 
there are strong norms handed down from one generation to another that appropriate salaries 
for men are higher than for women. They are rooted in traditional values favoring gender 
specific specialization, giving men priority on the labor market and women priority in the 
household. Intuitively, the view of men’s priority on the labor market leads to higher 
reference wages of men compared to women. We think of the reference wage as a cognitively 
relevant standard that affects how people evaluate their income. This reference wage can be 
understood to affect actual wages, e.g., in a bargaining setting, where one’s reference standard 
determines the initial offer, as well as the effort invested in negotiating a higher salary. Social 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Blau and Kahn (2000), Stanley and Jarrell (1998) and Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 
(2005). 
2 See, e.g., Clark (1997) and Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000). 
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work norms can then lead to a situation in which (i) women are earning less than men and (ii) 
they yet do not feel worse off.3 
We investigate the extent to which shared norms regarding equal rights are relevant on the 
labor market by studying a national referendum on an equal rights amendment to the Swiss 
constitution in 1981. A central proposition of the equal rights amendment was that “women 
and men shall have the right to equal pay for work of equal value”. This referendum thus 
provides a measure of the degree to which voters believe that the appropriate pay for a woman 
is equal to that of a man. This proxy measure enables us to identify communities where 
people challenge the traditional role model and where women demand equality.  
We find that there is a smaller gender wage gap for workers in communities where people 
strongly approved the constitutional amendment on equal rights (liberal communities) than in 
traditional communities. This finding is consistent with the first implication of a norms based 
explanation derived from the notion that women in liberal communities have higher reference 
standards of what is an appropriate salary than women in more traditional communities.  
In order to study the second implication of a norms based explanation of the gender wage gap, 
the subjective well-being of women compared to men is analyzed. If the large gender wage 
gap in traditional communities is due to internalized norms, women in these communities are 
not expected to report lower subjective well-being than in liberal communities. However, if it 
is due to discrimination that is perceived as such, the life satisfaction of employed women is 
expected to be lower in traditional communities compared to liberal ones. Our findings for 
working women and men indicate that women are not less (but even more) satisfied with their 
life in traditional compared to liberal communities (while there are no significant differences 
for men across communities). This finding is again consistent with a framework that 
incorporates social norms. Furthermore, perceived discrimination of women compared to men 
is higher (not lower) in liberal than in traditional communities.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that the societal approval of equal rights plays a 
significant role in the labor market success of women compared to men. In interpreting our 
findings, the possibility of omitted variable biases has, however, to be kept in mind. We 
therefore study a range of alternative explanations and differential predictions. 
This paper does not discuss how the specific social work norms developed. Norms can evolve 
to justify current practice if, e.g., past discrimination influences current expectations. Social 
                                                
3 Crosby (1982) calls the same phenomenon the „paradox of the contented female worker“ and refers 
to relative deprivation theory to explain it. Related research is, e.g., discussed in Phelan (1994).  
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norms may then reflect imbedded effects of past gender discrimination which has been 
internalized by both women and men. Even though social work norms are seen as part of 
individuals’ preferences and thus relevant for experienced utility, some people might want to 
override them based on meta preferences for equality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the nature of gender 
differences in salary entitlements and its consequences for wage bargaining and labor market 
outcomes. Section 3 proposes a new measure to capture spatial differences in people’s beliefs 
about women’s role on the labor market. The empirical relevance of shared beliefs about 
women having equal rights on the labor market are studied in sections 4 and 5. We analyze a 
set of important labor market outcomes, as well as four survey measures on reported 
subjective well-being and perceptions of discrimination. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
2 Norms on the Appropriate Pay for Women and Men 
2.1 Why Are There Gender Specific Norms Regarding Appropriate Pay? 
Salaries are a useful starting point for considering gender differences in labor market success. 
When market forces determine salaries so that they come close to marginal factor 
productivity, there is no room for norms on gender specific appropriate pay. However, the 
importance of bargaining in wage determination indicates that there is scope for other factors 
in addition to productivity in determining salaries. While economic thinking has emphasized 
the role of the outside option in bargaining outcomes, there is ample evidence that social 
norms and fairness considerations also play an important role in wage setting (e.g. Bewley 
1999, Fehr and Gächter 2000). 
This paper argues that a particular social pay norm – the belief that women ought to earn as 
much as men for work of equal value – may affect the outcome of wage bargaining. This 
gender specific norm has developed over time. Historically, gender specific specialization has 
given men priority on the labor market and women in the household. Men were expected to 
keep a family and thus their appropriate salaries were higher than what they “needed” just for 
themselves. In contrast, female workers were not expected to keep a family and therefore 
“needed” less. The early literature in economics noted that  
“It is notorious that women get lower wages than men because women 
can live on less, or need less, or are helped out by home 
supplementation, or have their theatre tickets furnished them by their 
escorts.” (Davenport 1919) 
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Gender specific specialization was associated with strong gender specific socialization and 
occupational segregation. While females were taught to behave in a cooperative, selfless and 
nurturing way, males were taught to behave in a competitive and selfish way. These processes 
led to both sexes having systematically different expectations about what salary is appropriate 
for women’s and men’s work. This view is very succinctly expressed by a cotton-spinning 
mill owner:  
“[i]f men had from any cause to be employed in the work which 
women now do, they would undoubtedly get higher wages, though they 
might not do more or better work; the standard of their wages is 
higher” (cited in Webb 1891, p. 641). 
The double standards in appropriate earnings were explicitly studied among 200 white adults 
in Baltimore (Jasso and Webster 1997). Based on the vignette technique, they find that 
women as well as men considered appropriate earnings to be lower for women than for men. 
The female/male ratio in the “fair” gender wage gap is estimated at 0.85 for men and 0.88 for 
women. These results are due to a lower base level of the fair salaries, as well as lower returns 
to schooling for women than for men. Complementary evidence is from survey studies with 
small samples drawn from the college student population. In one study (Major et al. 1984), 76 
undergraduates had to determine what they thought would be a fair compensation for a fixed 
amount of work. The young women in the sample paid themselves less money than the young 
men did. In a second study by the same authors, 40 women and 40 men received a payment 
first and were then asked to do as much work as they thought  appropriate for the amount they 
had received. Women worked longer, made fewer mistakes and had a higher output. 
Differences in pay standards were also found for 126 people who determined either their own 
salary or the salary of another person. Women paid themselves less than men did and even 
less than what they paid other women (Callahan-Levy and Messe 1979). In another study 
(Bylsma and Major 1992), 203 undergraduates indicated how much they deserved to be paid 
in nine different employment scenarios. The earnings women felt that they deserved were 
lower than men’s earnings. It is also found that women’s ratings of their performance and 
their pay satisfaction are more influenced by comparing themselves with other women than 
with men (Bylsma and Major 1994). 
The norms about women’s and men’s separate roles on the labor market and about 
appropriate salaries are expected to still hold today to some extent, and imply gender specific 
differences in compensation. However, there are many women who do not share the norms 
anymore and some of them have been active in the women’s movement, have engaged in the 
introduction of equal rights legislation or have stood up for institutions that make job and 
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family life compatible. There is also a rethinking occurring in the minds of men and some 
giving up of traditional roles and norms. Thus, the extent to which the traditional norms are 
shared varies substantially between people, but also between countries, regions and even 
small neighboring communities.  
2.2 What are the Consequences of Gender Specific Appropriate Pay Norms? 
To the extent that women as well as men think that women deserve lower pay, women can be 
expected to negotiate in a systematically different way than men do. In fact, there is now 
substantial evidence that women ask for less than men, or do not ask at all in pay negotiations 
(Babcock and Laschever 2003, Riley and McGinn 2002, Säve-Söderbergh 2006, see also 
Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999 for a meta-analysis on gender differences in negotiation 
outcomes). Babcock and Laschever, for example, report from a survey in the United States 
that 20 percent of women said they never negotiated. For most women, the most recent pay 
negotiation goes twice as far back as for most men. Women’s reluctance to negotiate is 
reinforced by other parties in the bargaining process. Women who ask for more or promote 
themselves often suffer social reprisals, because they violate the gender prescription of being 
modest (Rudman 1998, Wade 2001). These gender specific beliefs about appropriate behavior 
and payoffs are also found in laboratory experiments with stylized bargaining situations. In 
ultimatum games, it is found that both women and men offer less to women, and both women 
and men choose higher minimum acceptable offers when the proposer is a woman (Solnick 
2001). 
A straightforward prediction of women making lower initial offers in salary negotiations and 
negotiating less often is that they earn less than men for equal work.4 There is a substantial 
literature in labor economics studying gender differences in wages. A key difficulty in this 
research, however, is the identification of the causal mechanisms leading women to earn less 
than men for seemingly equal work (Altonji and Blank 1999). Many findings that are usually 
regarded as discrimination by employers, fellow male employees and customers, or as 
statistical discrimination, can be well understood in a framework of norms about gender 
specific appropriate salaries. Examples are findings about the gender wage gap under 
collective bargaining (e.g. Blau and Kahn 2003). In particular, as the position of female 
employees’ in collective salary negotiations is strengthened, lower gender differences 
                                                
4 Norms about women’s and men’s role on the labor market do not only affect the outcomes of salary 
negotiations, but also decisions about promotion (for related work on glass ceiling see, e.g., Albrecht 
et al. 2003) and advanced training or shared expectations about appropriate effort on the job. 
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compared to individual bargaining might indicate that gender specific appropriate salaries are 
partly overcome. Another set of findings is about the effect of product market competition on 
the gender wage gap. In a study about the US banking sector, e.g., liberalization is argued to 
have reduced the possibilities for employer discrimination (Black and Strahan 2001). An 
alternative interpretation is that as the pot of money to be distributed among employees got 
smaller, it was no longer possible to satisfy men’s relatively higher aspirations in negotiations 
about their compensation. However, the strength of social norms about gender differences in 
appropriate salaries has, as far as we are aware, never been measured explicitly in order to be 
able to test such alternative explanations more closely.  
3 Measuring Norms Regarding Appropriate Pay 
We propose measuring the norm that women’s appropriate salaries are not different than 
men’s using the voting outcome on an amendment to the Swiss constitution. In January 1975, 
the fourth national congress of women in Switzerland decided to launch a popular initiative 
postulating equal rights for women and men. Up till then, article 4 of the Swiss constitution 
held that “all human beings are equal before the law”. Skeptics suggested that legal practice 
only ensured that all women were equal and all men were equal, but no woman was a man’s 
equal in the eyes of the law. Note that Switzerland is quite conservative regarding women’s 
rights. For instance, the Swiss government did not ratify Charter 100 of the ILO, demanding 
equal rights for women and men, until 1972. 
The initiative proposed amending the constitution by an article that listed in detail the specific 
areas and the respective rights that should be made law. In December 1975, the committee 
launching the popular initiative had collected the number of signatures required to force the 
Swiss government to schedule the initiative. The parliament decided to work out a counter 
proposal reading as follows: 
“Men and women have equal rights. Legislation shall ensure legal 
equality, particularly in the areas of family, education and work. Men 
and women shall have the right to equal pay for work of equal value." 
The committee who launched the initiative decided to withdraw the original version of the 
amendment.  
The constitutional amendment covers three important areas: Equality within the family was an 
essential ingredient to the cause of Swiss women, because the prevailing family law stipulated 
the husband as being the head of the family and being the sole actor to represent the family 
outside. Equality in education was deemed an important cause, because school curricula were 
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reflecting the old view that girls should be taught the skills of running a household, as 
opposed to boys who should be able to support the household. Thus, from secondary school 
onwards, girls tended to be taught how to knit and cook, whereas boys perfected their skills in 
mathematics. The area of market work formed an essential pillar of the constitutional 
amendment, because women earned, on average, 30% less than men.5 It is noteworthy that, in 
contrast to the general norms stipulated with respect to family and education, the amendment 
contains the explicit directive that women must earn the same money for work of equal value. 
Thus, this third requirement was to improve the legal situation of women immediately after 
the vote had been cast.6 
The public debate in the newspapers focused mainly on two issues. “Will a ‘Yes’ to this 
amendment mean the end of the family?”7 and “Equal work – but the wage is different”8. The 
issue of the implications for the family has to be seen against the backdrop of the 1968 
revolution. Conservative thinkers argued that this amendment might be used to create the 
legal framework that would destroy the “main pillar of society”. The second issue of unequal 
pay was addressed in several ways. First, some newspapers focused on minimum wages in 
identical occupations. For instance, it was found that the minimum wage for a male sales 
clerk was 1900.- CHF / month, whereas a female sales clerk earned only 1640.- CHF / month. 
Second, a dissertation at the University of Berne investigating unequal pay between women 
and men got a lot of press coverage (Reis 1988). Relying on unusually rich data regarding 
work input, this dissertation found that women did indeed earn less than men, that the 
expected job duration of women was shorter, representation of women in unions was lower, 
and that discrimination might contribute to this differential pay for equal work. This shows 
that voters were indeed confronted with the issue that women were earning less than men.  
On June 14, 1981, Swiss voters had to decide whether they would like to amend the Swiss 
constitution to reflect not only equality of human beings in general but equality of women and 
                                                
5 This is the gender wage differential cited in the newspapers, discussing equal pay for women and 
men in 1981. 
6 It was understood at the time that primarily the private sector would be affected by this vote. The 
public sector had been covered by the ILO equal rights agreement No. 100 that the Swiss government 
had ratified in 1972, and by a federal law passed in 1977. The amendment did not directly invalidate 
all contracts between employers and workers that stipulated different pay for equal work. Instead, each 
contract had to be reviewed separately by the court in order to determine violation of the constitution 
(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 30, 1981).  
7 Headline of an article in the newspaper Blick, June 3, 1981. 
8 Headline of an article in the newspaper Luzerner Neuste Nachrichten, June 4, 1981. 
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men in particular. A total of 707,702 voters (or 60.2% of the electorate) and 17 cantons voted 
in favor of the amendment, while 525,885 voters and 9 cantons opposed the amendment – the 
initiative proved to be successful.9 In the exit poll, the main reasons in favor of the 
amendment were “Equal pay for work of equal value”, “Equal rights” and “Women are worth 
as much as men” reported by roughly 70% of the voters interviewed. 
This shows that the vote indeed reflects the extent to which voters agree with the norm that 
women should earn what men do if they do the same work.10  
Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional distribution of approval of equal rights across 2896 Swiss 
communities, with lighter shading reflecting a higher proportion of people approving of equal 
rights. On the one hand, the west and the south-east parts of Switzerland, as well as the area 
around Zurich tended to favor the constitutional amendment strongly. On the other hand, a 
dark belt of communities stretching from the south-west to the north-east of Switzerland 
expressed their disapproval of the amendment. There is a surprising number  of communities 
in which not only men but also a significant proportion of women must have rejected the 
amendment. This suggests that not only one’s own material well-being (instrumental voting), 
but rather the shared beliefs about the appropriate pay and position of women were important 
in the voting decision (expressive voting).11 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In the empirical analysis below, we take the voting result to measure the extent to which 
people share the view that women should have the same rights in all areas of life and the same 
                                                
9 A constitutional amendment has to be accepted by both the majority of people and the majority of 
cantons. 
10 In reaction to the vote, the Swiss employer’s association printed a booklet to be distributed to its 
members containing, among other things, the reasons for unequal pay between women and men. 
“There is scientific proof that women are 30% [note that this figure coincides exactly with the gender 
wage differential at that time] less productive than men. This finding is based on studies that study the 
oxygen-intake capacity of male and female subjects”. 
11 It would, of course, also be possible to develop an argument why women who voted “no” followed 
their material self-interest (instrumental voting). Intra household bargaining theory, e.g., suggests that 
a woman not working in the labor market is more concerned with the impact of the referendum on her 
husband’s salary than her own potential salary in the future. To the extent that the amendment leads to 
overall wage pressure, she would find it in her material self-interest to vote against equal pay. 
However, the motives for approval or disapproval stated in the survey conducted immediately after the 
vote, do not align with considerations following from intra household bargaining theory. This can still 
mean that the change in legislation had some consequences in the direction predicted by models of the 
family. 
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entitlements on the labor market as men.12 We rely on the vote as a proxy that captures the 
views of voters in 1981, which we then merge with information on labor market and 
subjective well-being outcomes at the end of the 20th century. This means that we can 
investigate both a direct channel that runs from individual values and norms to well-being (for 
the older cohorts) as well as an indirect inter-generational channel, whereby we study the role 
of the parents’ views for the children’s outcomes (for the younger cohorts). Of course, 
merging past information on norms with current information on outcomes implies 
measurement error and leads to lower bound estimates. However, it is likely that individuals, 
who were liberally minded 20 years ago, still tend to live in liberal communities. Moreover, 
choosing to live in communities where people share similar norms facilitates the analysis 
rather than hampers it. 
For a social work norm to be relevant in wage determination today, it is, of course, necessary 
that gender differences with respect to appropriate pay still exist. Based on the vignette 
technique13, Jann (2003) asks a random subset of a total of 531 survey respondents in 
Switzerland whether they think that 4000.- CHF / month (~2700 US$) is too low or too high 
for Mrs. Smith (on an 11 point scale). A randomly chosen second set of survey respondents 
rate whether the same income is appropriate for Mr. Smith. Results indicate that survey 
respondents think that 4000.- CHF / month is much too low for Mr. Smith in comparison with 
Mrs. Smith. Thus, there is still evidence for gender specific differences in appropriate pay 
today.14  
                                                
12 Note that it is not possible to rely on different votes and / or survey results to find an equally 
convincing proxy for the social pay norm. Possible candidates for different votes include the national 
referendums on extending suffrage to women held in 1959 (rejection) and 1971 (approval). These 
referendums capture more generally than the present popular initiative the notion of political equality 
between men and women. Surveys tend to focus more directly on values. However, the problem with 
surveys is that no outcome is tied to them (in comparison to casting a vote) and they thus likely 
contain more measurement error. Moreover, it is not possible to rely on them to measure the norms 
that prevail within communities. Practically, there are not a sufficient number of observations for any 
communities other than a few big cities. 
13 Jann (2003) applies the same technique as used in the work by Jasso and Webster cited in section 
2.1. 
14 Previous research shows that the ratio of the earnings of women relative to men is lowest in 
Switzerland in comparison with the U.S. and six other OECD countries (Blau and Kahn 1992). The 
unexplained component of the wage differential is especially high for workers with low education 
(Bonjour and Gerfin 2001). Flückiger and Ramirez (2000) analyze the changes in the wage structure 
between men  and women from 1994 to 1996. 
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4 Norms on Appropriate Pay and the Gender Wage Gap 
Social norms about women’s role on the labor market and shared beliefs about their 
appropriate salaries are expected to be important determinants of actual wages. We study this 
claim based on our proxy measure for equal rights and a large data set about individuals’ 
labor market outcomes. We rely on the first thirteen waves of the Swiss Labor Force Survey 
(SLFS). This rotating panel survey started in 1991. Interviews are conducted each year in 
springtime. The information gathered is primarily used to generate up-to-date information on 
the state of the Swiss labor market. Since the SLFS contains information on the community of 
residence, we can merge information on the percentage of voters who approved the equal 
rights amendment in 1981. In total, there are 2896 communities (bottom level political 
jurisdictions) in Switzerland, ranging in size from several hundred inhabitants up to more than 
300,000 inhabitants. 
The analysis concentrates on all observations with valid information on income, contractual 
hours of work, and additional information concerning human capital and demographic 
information. This yields a total of 117,878 observations covering 73,526 individuals living in 
2,498 different communities. 
Figure 2 presents a kernel regression of the log of the hourly rate of pay on the  approval of 
equal rights.15 There are two striking features in this figure. First, women’s wages tend to be 
much lower than men’s wages. Second, there is a marked increase in the wage rate of women 
in line with equal rights being approved. In contrast, the wage rate of men is much less 
sensitive to the voting outcome. This is consistent with differences in social work norms 
being reflected in labor market outcomes.  
Table 1 presents additional descriptive evidence on the relevance of gender specific norms 
regarding the labor market position of women compared to men. In addition to the log of the 
hourly rate of pay, we concentrate on three labor market outcomes: years of schooling, years 
of actual experience, and years of tenure with the current employer. Actual experience is 
defined in the SLFS as the duration of employment since the last interruption in employment 
that lasted longer than 6 months. It is crucial to measure actual experience, since this human 
capital input measure reflects more adequately than potential experience (i.e. age minus time 
spent in education) the differential attachment to the labor market between women and men. 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                
15 The hourly wage rate is calculated by dividing annual earnings by annual hours. We use a gaussian 
kernel with default bandwidth in kernreg1.ado for STATA. 
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The first two columns in table 1 report gender differences in the weighted mean of the log of 
the hourly rate of pay.16 Women who live in communities with approval rates below average 
(<60%) earn 30% (=(exp(-.349)-1)*100) less than men. The corresponding gender wage gap 
is 24% in communities with approval of equal rights above average (>60%). Thus, regional 
differences in approval of equal rights are correlated statistically and economically 
significantly with the gender wage differential. The higher the proportion of people voting in 
favor of equal rights in 1981, the lower is the wage gap between women and men in our 
sample from 1991-2003. Columns 3 to 8 in table 1 perform a similar analysis for the number 
of years of schooling, number of years of work experience, and number of years of tenure. 
The idea is, that in communities that hold the view that women should earn equal pay for 
equal work, women may have stronger incentives to invest in human capital. The descriptive 
evidence in table 1 weakly suggests that women tend to have a smaller educational 
disadvantage compared to men in communities with approval rates exceeding 60%. With 
respect to work experience, we find that women have 8 years less actual experience than men 
in conservative communities. The corresponding figure in liberal communities is only 6 years. 
Interestingly, this result does not originate primarily from higher investment of women in 
work experience, but also from weaker investment of men in liberal communities. The last 
outcome, the number of years of tenure with the current employer, is studied in columns 7 and 
8. We find that women tend to have shorter tenure representing lower investments in specific 
human capital than men, and that this disadvantage tends to be much lower in liberal areas 
than in conservative areas. In contrast to the results for work experience, we find here that this 
effect originates primarily from differences in women’s investments in specific human 
capital. 
Table 2 performs the same difference-in-differences analysis in a regression setting. All 
regressions control for nationality, marital status, part-time status, canton of residence effects, 
and time-effects. In addition, results for the wage rate include number of years of schooling, 
number of years of work experience (and its square), and number of years of tenure (and its 
square) as control variables (see table A.1 in the appendix for results regarding the control 
variables). Robust standard errors are reported, adjusted for clustering within communities. 
The fraction approving of equal rights is standardized, i.e. demeaned and divided by the 
standard deviation. Thus, the coefficient for “Female” in column 1 of table 2 measures the 
                                                
16 We use the inverse of the sampling probability as weights, because some waves of the SLFS tend to 
over-sample specific areas of Switzerland. Weighting effectively ensures that the results are 
representative at the national level.  
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gender wage differential in the community with average approval of equal rights (60%) and 
the coefficient for “Approval of equal rights” gives the change in the log of the hourly rate of 
pay associated with an increase by one standard deviation (8%) for men. Results show that 
women’s wage rates are 13.8% lower than men’s wages in the average community. Men’s 
wage rates increase by 3.5% when the approval of equal rights increases by one standard 
deviation.17 This may be due to the fact that approval of equal rights is low in rural areas (with 
relatively lower wages) and high in cities (with relatively higher wages). The interaction term 
“Female * approval of equal rights” indicates that the wage rate of women tends to increase 
even more than for men in line with approval of equal rights. For an increase by one standard 
deviation, the gender wage gap is reduced by 2.4 percentage points. The coefficient is 
strongly significant in the statistical sense. More importantly, the result indicates that the 
mean gender wage gap is narrowed by as much as one sixth, due to an increase of one 
standard deviation in the approval of equal pay for equal work.18  
This latter result is not driven by differential occupational sorting of women and men across 
space. In a first robustness check, 3-digit occupation information x year is added to the basic 
regression in table 2 column 1 (not shown). Similar to the baseline regression, we find that a 
one standard deviation increase in the approval of equal rights reduces the gender wage gap 
by about one sixth. The coefficients of the extended specification estimate a slightly larger 
gender wage gap of 0.185 (s.d. 0.003) at the mean, a smaller gradient between the rate of 
approval and wages for men (0.010, s.d. 0.002), but a larger gradient for women (0.030, s.d. 
0.003). 
[Table 2 about here] 
The second column in table 2 reports results for number of years of schooling. In contrast to 
the descriptive evidence in table 1, we do not find a significant correlation of the gender gap 
in schooling with the approval of equal rights. However, for both work experience and tenure 
with the current employer, we find a significant and quantitatively important reduction in the 
female disadvantage associated with higher approval of equal rights. Results suggest that up 
to one sixth or .86 years (.39 years) of the average difference in work experience (tenure) of 
4.83 years (2.16 years) between women and men disappears due to a one standard deviation 
increase in the approval of equal rights. In contrast to results for wages, there are no regional 
                                                
17 This result is conditional on potential regional differences in schooling, work experience, and tenure. 
18 Differences in prices across communities do not invalidate this conclusion, since prices are identical 
for women and men across communities.  
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differences in work experience and tenure for men (coefficient for “Approval of equal 
rights”), however, imprecisely measured. 
It is interesting to compare the whole narrowing of the gender wage gap across regions (when 
no productivity characteristics are taken into account) with the extent that the gender wage 
gap narrows, controlling for human capital, experience and tenure. In an unconditional 
regression of the wage rate on canton effects and time effects (not shown), we find that the 
gender wage gap narrows by 4.9 percentage points due to an increase by one standard 
deviation in the share of people approving equal rights. In contrast, the first column in table 2 
shows that, conditional on observed characteristics, the gender wage gap narrows by 2.4 
percentage points, due to an increase by one standard deviation in the approval rate. The total 
effect is thus about twice as strong as the conditional effect. This suggests that the social norm 
that women should earn as much as men may lead to an indirect increase in the wage rate (via 
gender differences in human capital investment) of about the same order of magnitude as the 
direct effect of this belief on wages (via gender differences in bargaining behavior).   
Table 3 investigates the sensitivity of our result for wages in six sub-samples. Communities in 
Switzerland differ with respect to size and population density. Recent work on monopsony in 
labor market argues that, in rural areas, employers might have comparably more monopsony 
power than in areas with higher density of jobs, like in cities (Manning 2003). The 
monopsony wage is lower for groups who react less elastically to wages earned with the 
current employer. If separation elasticities are lower for women than for men19, women will 
earn less in rural areas than men compared to more densely populated areas.20 Moreover, 
approval of equal rights is higher in cities than in rural areas. This suggests that the main 
result reported in table 2 might be spurious. Differences in wage settings with respect to the 
size of the community instead of the appropriate pay norm are driving the results. We address 
this first issue by performing a separate analysis for communities with a population of less 
than 20,000 inhabitants (in 1990) and communities with a population of 20,000 inhabitants or 
more. First, we find that women’s wages tend to be lower than men’s wages in both samples 
by a similar magnitude, the difference amounting to about .14 log points (columns 1 and 2 in 
table 3). Second, in the sample of large communities, there is a strong and statistically 
significant increase in the wages earned by women compared to the wages earned by men in 
                                                
19 See Ransom and Oaxaca (2004) for recent evidence on gender differences in the elasticity of 
separations with respect to the wage earned in the current job. 
20 A second argument in favor of contrasting rural areas with cities rests on the presumption that the 
fraction of jobs that is tailored entirely to men or women is higher in rural areas than in cities.  
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more liberal communities. This means that the main result reported in table 2 cannot be 
rationalized via differences in wage settings across urban and rural communities.21 
The second analysis contrasts cohorts born before 1960, who presumably voted in 1981, and 
cohorts born after 1960, who were not allowed to vote in 1981.22 This split in the sample 
allows for the study of the inter-generational transmission of social norms. People in the 
younger cohorts have not directly affected the voting outcome. For them, we capture only the 
effect of being raised in a liberal community as opposed to being raised in a conservative 
community. At first glance, it seems that, in younger cohorts, there are smaller norm effects 
than in older cohorts.23 The interaction term “Female * approval of equal rights” is much 
smaller in younger cohorts than in older cohorts. However, in relation to the gender wage gap 
in the average community, the norm effect is of the same relative magnitude across cohorts. A 
one standard deviation increase in the approval of equal rights is estimated to decrease the 
gender wage gap by one sixth. This suggests that social norms regarding appropriate pay for 
women compared to men are also relevant in cohorts that have entered the labor market only 
recently and matter even to the same relative extent.  
The third comparison distinguishes the private service sector from the public sector 
(education and public administration).24 Comparing these two sectors is motivated by the fact 
that wage bargaining is less common in the public sector, and that the public sector was 
covered by legislation writing down the equality of pay between women and men as early as 
1977.25 In contrast, it proved to be very difficult to actually substantiate the claim that equal 
pay for equal work was violated in the private service sector. First, in comparison with the 
public sector, it is less common in the private sector that women and men work the same jobs. 
                                                
21 The fact that the interaction term female * approval of equal rights is larger for cities than for 
relatively small communities may indicate that place of work and place of residence coincides to a 
larger extent in the former than in the latter. Moreover, expressed norms in 1981 may be a less 
accurate proxy for norms to today in small communities due to differences in migration. 
22 The minimum age for voting at the national level was 20 in 1981. 
23 Alternatively, it is likely that individuals, who were relatively old in 1981, are more likely to still be 
living in the same community than younger individuals. Thus, the voting proxy for the social norms 
regarding the position of women on the labor market may be better for older cohorts than for younger 
cohorts. 
24 Note that these results focus on services because the type of work performed by women and men 
across service industries is more homogenous than across all industries. Results for the remaining 
32,365 observations are similar to the results for the private sector services industries. Results are 
available upon request from the authors.  
25 On October 12, 1977, the Swiss federal court ruled that female teachers in the canton of Neuchâtel 
have to be granted the same salary scale as their male colleagues.  
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Second, salary levels are almost public knowledge in the public sector, whereas in the private 
sector the wage policy is kept secret more often than not.  
Results for the private sector indicate that the gender wage gap in the average community 
amounts to almost 15% and that the gender wage gap is lower in communities that have voted 
more strongly in favor of the equal rights amendment (column 5 in table 3). In contrast, the 
gender wage gap in the public sector is much smaller (about 6.3%) and this gap is 
independent of the approval of equal rights. This result is in line with standardized 
compensation rules and legislation equalizing relative pay between women and men across 
communities, irrespective of the prevailing social pay norm.26 
Our findings provoke some economic follow up questions and empirical concerns that we 
would like to briefly mention. First, one might ask why not all women move to liberal areas if 
differences in outcomes actually reflect causal effects of social norms on economic well-
being. As argued earlier, the respective social norms are seen to be internalized, learnt by the 
individuals during the formative years at home or at school. It is not possible to get rid of such 
views just by moving. This implies that even if women did move to more liberal areas, we 
should not see objective measures of well-being improve. Second, the questions arise why 
firms do not concentrate on hiring women in traditional communities exploiting the situation 
and thus whether the empirical finding can reflect an equilibrium (following the classical 
reasoning of Becker 1957). We think that market forces in fact partly wipe out differences in 
compensation due to social work norms. However, we also think that there are still 
‘sufficient’ market imperfections that norm effects can put a wedge between productivity and 
compensation. 
The empirical concerns relate to the inherent problems with cross section analyses. First, it is 
not possible to rule out that unobserved gender differences in productivity or in the demand of 
work place amenities are driving our results. However, an alternative explanation based on 
these factors is difficult to align with the differential results for location of residence, cohorts, 
                                                
26 The fact that women are, on average, paid less than men in the public sector suggests that 
unmeasured productive characteristics are important. Unfortunately, it is not possible to address the 
concern with unmeasured productive characteristics with information on regional mobility because 
mobility is endogenous. However, note that sorting of unproductive (relative to women) men into 
liberal areas (or vice versa) is at odds with the evidence in table 3. We find that there is no correlation 
of the gender wage gap with voting in industries where appropriate pay norms are unimportant in 
affecting pay policies, i.e. public sector service industries. This suggests that gender differences in 
unobserved productivity are unlikely to explain the fact that gender wage gaps are smaller in liberal 
areas compared to conservative areas. 
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and industries. Second, it is possible that local differences in compensation for reasons that 
are not related to norms might have affected voting decisions. Settling this issue of omitted 
variable bias would require estimations with valid instruments. So far, we do not see this as a 
feasible task in the current setting. Instead, we pursue the approach of testing a second 
important implication of the idea that norms regarding appropriate pay explain gender 
differences in compensation. 
5 Norms on Appropriate Pay and Subjective Well-Being 
Subjective measures of people’s well-being offer a complementary possibility for studying 
the consequences of social norms about the role of women on the labor market. Traditional 
economic reasoning would predict that women who experience a larger gender wage gap also 
experience relative lower utility than men. However, if social norms are affecting salaries and 
the gender wage gap, women in traditional areas need not feel worse off than women in 
liberal areas because women in traditional areas have lower salary expectations to begin with. 
Subjective well-being is captured by measures of reported happiness, satisfaction with life, or 
satisfaction with particular life domains, like one’s job. These measures of reported subjective 
well-being passed a series of validation exercises and seem to significantly correlate with true 
positive inner feelings (see Frey and Stutzer 2002a,b for introductions to the economics of 
happiness and references to the validation literature). Thus, measures of reported subjective 
well-being offer new opportunities for understanding the effect of social norms on individual 
welfare.27 Moreover, they allow a direct empirical analysis of two related issues: 
First, in the context of discrimination, it is misleading to only look at the outcomes in order to 
make welfare judgments. It is most likely that discrimination per se, i.e. how women are 
treated, has negative effects on women’s subjective well-being.28 
Second, subjective well-being may be affected by reference standards. According to standard 
economics, income enters individuals’ utility function in an absolute sense. Consistent with 
the important role of standards of appropriate salaries in negotiation behavior, however, 
reference standards also affect the subjective evaluation of labor market outcomes. People 
judge their situation relative to their aspirations or some reference standard and it is the 
                                                
27 In a previous study, the role of the social norm to live by one’s own earnings in unemployed 
people’s life satisfaction has been analyzed. It has been found that the stronger the social norm to 
work, the less satisfied unemployed people are with their life (Stutzer and Lalive 2004). 
28 This can be understood as procedural disutility (see Frey et al. 2004 for the concept of procedural 
utility) that affects women’s well-being beyond narrow economic outcomes such as wages. 
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discrepancy between this reference standard and the actual outcome that determines people’s 
subjective well-being. In a direct test of this concept of relative utility, higher income 
aspirations are related to lower life satisfaction ceteris paribus (Stutzer 2004).29 Norms 
prescribing females’ wages to be lower than men’s wages can thus be expected to positively 
affect women’s subjective well-being, because their lower salary standards reduce the gap 
between expected and actual income (Clark 1997). This mechanism could explain the finding 
mentioned in the introduction that, in most countries, women do not report lower subjective 
well-being than men, despite gender wage gaps persisting. 
We approach the question using a second data set: the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). We use 
the first three available waves from 1999 to 2001. The SHP is a representative survey for 
Switzerland and contains roughly 7,000 individual observations per wave from roughly 1,000 
different communities. In addition to standard socio-economic characteristics, it includes a 
question about job satisfaction in 1999, a question about satisfaction with life in the years 
2000 and 2001, as well as questions about perceived general and individual penalization by 
the opposite sex in the years 2000 and 2001. The concrete question wording is as follows: 
- In general, how satisfied are you with your life if 0 means "not at all satisfied" and 10 
means "completely satisfied"? 
- On a scale from 0 "not at all satisfied" to 10 "completely satisfied" can you indicate 
your degree of satisfaction with your job generally? 
- Do you have the feeling that in Switzerland women are penalized compared with men 
in certain areas, if 0 means "not at all penalized" and 10 "strongly penalized"?  
- Do you, in your everyday life, feel penalized compared with the opposite sex, if 0  
means "not at all penalized" and 10 "strongly penalized"? 
Answers to these questions are merged with data on the approval of equal rights at the 
community level. 
We assess the possible correlations between our proxy measure for social norms about 
women’s role on the labor market and their subjective well-being in two steps. In a 
descriptive analysis (presented in table 4), raw correlations are assessed. They include 
                                                
29 In a study of 5,000 British workers, Clark and Oswald (1996) formed the reference income as the 
average income of persons with the same labor market characteristics. They conclude that the higher 
the income of the reference group, the less satisfied people are with their job. 
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potentially important correlated variation in individual socio-demographic characteristics, 
such as education. Partial correlations are shown in table 5. 
We first discuss the results for reported satisfaction with life, based on a sample of salaried 
women and men. Descriptive statistics indicate that there is no significant difference in life 
satisfaction between women and men in communities where a large number of the citizens 
approved the equal rights amendment (approval rate > 60%). In contrast, women working in 
the labor market are significantly more satisfied with their lives than men in conservative 
communities (approval rate < 60%). This results in a negative difference-in-differences 
estimation for being a woman and living in a high approval rather than in a low approval 
community. In table 5, these findings are replicated in a multiple regression controlling for a 
large number of individual characteristics (the full estimation results are presented in table 
A.2 in the appendix). Robust standard errors are reported adjusted for clustering within 
communities. Like in the previous sub-section, the variable measuring the approval of equal 
rights is standardized to mean zero and standard deviation 1. Results show that employed 
women, on average, are more satisfied than men, reporting a 0.15 higher score of subjective 
well-being than employed men.30 The coefficient for “Approval of equal rights” indicates that 
salaried men are equally satisfied with their life across communities, independent of 
differences in the social norms for the role of women on the labor market. However, as 
captured by the interaction term “Female * approval of equal rights “, employed women are 
statistically significantly less satisfied with their life in communities where a larger 
percentage of the population approved equal rights. If the approval rate is increased from one 
standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, average life 
satisfaction is reduced by 0.19 units on the 10-point scale. This is a large negative effect, 
equivalent to having an incomplete compulsory school education rather than having served an 
apprenticeship, or equal to one seventh of the negative effect of unemployment on life 
satisfaction.31 
[Table 4 and 5 about here] 
This result runs contrary to an interpretation of the wage results in the previous section, in 
terms of perceived discrimination in traditional communities. It is important to note that 
earned income is not included in the estimation function and thus the correlation between the 
                                                
30 The gender effect is measured at the sample mean of the variable capturing social pay norms. 
31 Estimation results including the partial correlation between unemployment and life satisfaction in 
the SHP can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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norm proxy and life satisfaction does not capture a possible trade-off between living in a 
liberal community (with for some reason low quality of life) and earning a higher salary. 
Before we provide possible interpretations of the findings for the gender wage gap and the life 
satisfaction gap in more and less liberal communities, we present additional results for 
women’s and men’s subjective evaluation of their living situation. As in previous studies, we 
find higher job satisfaction for women than for men (coefficient for “Female”=0.16). 
However, we have too small a sample to be able to statistically precisely estimate a partial 
correlation between the approval of equal rights and regional variation in job satisfaction. So 
far, a negative coefficient for the interaction variable is estimated that is of similar magnitude 
(absolute and relative to the gender gap) to the coefficient in the life satisfaction equation. 
Tables 4 and 5 include two questions about people’s perception of gender discrimination. 
Contrary to the evidence about the gender wage gap, which is smaller in communities where 
equal rights have been broadly approved than where there was a lot of opposition, women feel 
more penalized in more liberal communities than in traditional communities. This result is 
found in the descriptive statistics, as well as in the partial correlations. Moreover, the 
questions are posed whether people think that women are penalized generally, as well as  
personally, compared to the opposite sex. Not surprisingly, for both measures women report 
higher ratings of being penalized.  
There are, of course, alternative explanations to the negative correlation between the approval 
of equal rights and women’s satisfaction with life. First, women in liberal communities might 
just be the precursors of a movement that tries to change traditional norms about women’s 
restricted role on the labor market. This “revolt” may have some gains in terms of higher 
salaries, but might result in even higher costs due to the social sanctions by traditional women 
and men. Second, it might well be that equality at the work place has developed substantially 
in more liberal communities, as reflected by the lower gender wage gap. However, working 
women may still have to carry most of the burden of doing the housework. In fact, we find 
that women not participating on the labor market are not less satisfied with their life in more 
liberal communities (results not shown). This would suggest that women’s emancipation is 
restricted to the work place.  
6 Concluding Remarks 
It is well known that women earn less than men. However, women are not less satisfied with 
their jobs or with their lives than men. This paper argues that the extent to which women and 
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men believe that a woman’s appropriate salary is equal to a man’s salary may be important in 
understanding this puzzle. Historically, women and men tended to specialize in different areas 
of life, with men being responsible for the family income and women being responsible for 
the well-being of the family. 
This paper captures the extent to which such gender specific norms still apply today with the 
voting outcome regarding an equal rights amendment to the Swiss constitution in 1981. The 
approval rate for the equal rights amendment, prescribing “equal pay for equal work”, varies 
very strongly across communities. Thus, it is possible to assess the relevance of gender 
specific pay norms for the relative success of women and men on the labor market by linking 
the gender wage gap measured for the years 1991-2003 to the voting outcome. Results 
indicate that the mean gender wage gap is narrowed by as much as one sixth, due to an 
increase of one standard deviation in the approval of equal rights. Moreover, there is no 
corresponding effect in the public sector, which applies standardized compensation rules and 
was covered by non-discriminatory legislation as early as 1977. 
As wage differences may not capture the full extent to which women’s lives are affected by 
gender specific pay norms and prescriptions about appropriate behavior on the labor market, 
we study self-reported subjective well-being for 2000/01. Results indicate that, in contrast to 
an explanation based on perceived discrimination, women in conservative areas (with strong 
disapproval of equal rights and a large gender wage gap) are more (not less) satisfied with 
their life than men. There is no corresponding difference between women and men in liberal 
areas. This result reinforces the interpretation based on gender specific identity and 
internalized norms regarding appropriate pay for women compared to men.  
The explanation, based on the social norms of differential labor market involvement of 
women and men, implies that changing the outcomes for women will take a long time. 
Understanding the dynamics at work seems an interesting topic for future research. Primarily, 
we shall address how anti-discrimination law affects women’s behavior and well-being, given 
their varying liberal views, and how their actual beliefs are affected. 
  22 
References 
Albrecht, James, Anders Bjorklund and Susan Vroman (2003). Is There a Glass Ceiling in 
Sweden? Journal of Labor Economics 21(1): 145-77. 
Altonji, Joseph G. und Rebecca M. Blank (1999). Race and Gender in the Labor Market. In: 
Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds). Handbook of Labor Economics. Volume 3C. 
Amsterdam; New York and Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-Holland: 3143-3259. 
Babcock, Linda and Laschever, Sara (2003). Women Don’t Ask. Negotiation and the Gender 
Divide. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Becker, Gary S. (1976). The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Bewley, Truman E. (1999). Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession. Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press. 
Black, Sandra E. and Philip E. Strahan (2001). The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and 
Discrimination in a Regulated Industry. American Economic Review 91(4): 814-31. 
Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn (1992). The Gender Earnings Gap: Learning from 
International Comparisons, American Economic Review 82(2): 533-538. 
Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn (2000). Gender Differences in Pay. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14(4): 75-99. 
Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn (2003). Understanding International Differences in 
the Gender Pay Gap. Journal of Labor Economics 21(1): 106-144. 
Bonjour, Dorothe and Michael Gerfin (2001). The Unequal Distribution of Unequal Pay - An 
Empirical Analysis of the Gender Wage Gap in Switzerland. Empirical Economics 26(2): 
407-428. 
Bylsma, Wayne H. and Brenda Major (1992). Two Routes to Eliminating Gender Differences 
in Personal Entitlement: Social Comparisons and Performance Evaluations. Psychology of 
Women Quarterly 16(2): 193-200. 
Bylsma, Wayne H. and Brenda Major (1994). Social Comparisons and Contentment: 
Exploring the Psychological Costs of the Gender Wage Gap. Psychology of Women 
Quarterly 18(2): 241-249. 
Callahan-Levy, Charlene M. and Lawrence A. Messe (1979). Sex Differences in the 
Allocation of Pay. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37(3): 433-446. 
Clark, Andrew E. (1997). Job Satisfaction and Gender: Why Are Women So Happy at Work? 
Labour Economics 4(4): 341-372.  
Clark, Andrew E. and Andrew J. Oswald (1996). Satisfaction and Comparison Income. 
Journal of Public Economics 61(3): 359-81. 
Crosby, Faye J. (1982). Relative Deprivation and Working Women. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Davenport, Herbert J. (1919). Wage Theory and Theories. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
33(2): 256-297. 
Fehr, Ernst and Gächter, Simon (2000). Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 159-181. 
Flückiger, Yves and José Ramirez (2000). Auf dem Weg zur Lohngleichheit? Bern: 
Eidgenössisches Büro für die Gleichstellung für Mann und Frau. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2002a). Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and 
Institutions Affect Human Well-Being. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2002b). What Can Economists Learn from Happiness 
  23 
Research? Journal of Economic Literature 40(2): 402-435. 
Frey, Bruno S., Matthias Benz and Alois Stutzer (2004). Procedural Utility: Not Only What, 
but Also How Matters. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160(3): 377-
401. 
Jann, Ben (2003). Lohngerechtigkeit und Geschlechterdiskriminierung: Experimentelle 
Evidenz. Mimeo, ETH Zurich. 
Jasso, Guillermina and Murray Webster Jr. (1997). Double Standards in Just Earnings for 
Male and Female Workers. Social Psychology Quarterly 60(1): 66-78. 
Major, Brenda, Dean B. McFarlin and Diana Gagnon (1984). Overworked and Underpaid: On 
the Nature of Gender Differences in Personal Entitlement. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 47(6): 1399-1412. 
Manning, Alan (2003). The Real Thin Theory: Monopsony in Modern Labour Markets. 
Labour Economics 10(2): 105-31. 
Phelan, Jo (1994). The Paradox of the Contented Female Worker: An Assessment of 
Alternative Explanations. Social Psychology Quarterly 57(2): 95-107. 
Ransom, Michael and Ronald Oaxaca (2004). New Market Power Models and Sex 
Differences in Pay. Paper presented at the IZA Workshop: The Nature of Discrimination, 
IZA, Bonn, Germany  
Reis, Hans (1988). Die Lohndifferenzen zwischen Männern und Frauen in der Schweiz. Bern: 
Peter Lang. 
Riley, Hannah and Kathleen L. McGinn (2002). When Does Gender Matter in Negotiation? 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty Research Working 
Paper No. 36. 
Säve-Söderbergh, Jenny (2006). Are Women Asking for Low Wages? An Empirical Analysis 
of Individual Wage Bargaining and Ability Signaling. Working Paper, Stockholm 
University. 
Solnick, Sara J. (2001). Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game. Economic Inquiry 39(2): 
189-200. 
Sousa-Poza, Alfonso and Andrés A. Sousa-Poza (2000). Taking Another Look at the 
Gender/Job-Satisfaction Paradox. Kyklos 53(2): 135-152.  
Stanley, T. D. and Stephen B. Jarrell (1998). Gender Wage Discrimination Bias? A Meta-
regression Analysis. Journal of Human Resources 33(4): 947-73. 
Stuhlmacher, Alice F. and Amy E. Walters (1999). Gender Differences in Negotiation 
Outcome: A Meta-Analysis. Personnel Psychology 52(3): 653-677. 
Stutzer, Alois (2004). The Role of Income Aspirations in Individual Happiness. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 54(1): 89-109. 
Stutzer, Alois and Rafael Lalive (2004). The Role of Social Work Norms in Job Searching 
and Subjective Well-Being. Journal of the European Economic Association 2(4): 696-719. 
Wade, Mary E. (2001). Women and Salary Negotiation: The Costs of Self-Advocacy. 
Psychology of Women Quarterly 25(1): 65-76. 
Webb, Sidney (1891). The Alleged Differences in the Wages Paid to Men and to Women for 
Similar Work. Economic Journal 1(4): 635-662. 
Weichselbaumer Doris and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer (2005). A Meta-Analysis of the 
International Gender Wage Gap. Journal of Economic Surveys 19(3): 479-511. 
 
 
 FI
GU
RE
 1 
AP
PR
OV
AL
 O
F T
HE
 C
ON
ST
IT
UT
IO
NA
L 
AM
EN
DM
EN
T 
ON
 EQ
UA
L 
RI
GH
TS
 IN
 SW
IT
ZE
RL
AN
D, 
19
81
 
 
No
tes
: L
igh
ter
 sh
ad
ing
 in
dic
ate
s a
 hi
gh
er 
pe
rce
nta
ge
 of
 vo
ter
s i
n f
av
or 
of 
ad
din
g a
n e
qu
al 
rig
hts
 am
en
dm
en
t to
 th
e S
wi
ss 
co
ns
titu
tio
n i
n 1
98
1. 
    
 R
esu
lts
 ar
e a
cro
ss 
28
96
 co
mm
un
itie
s. 
So
ur
ce
: S
tat
ist
ics
 Sw
itz
erl
an
d, 
ma
p p
rod
uc
ed
 w
ith
 m
ap
res
so
. 
 FI
GU
RE
 2 
AP
PR
OV
AL
 O
F E
QU
AL
 R
IG
HT
S A
ND
 W
AG
ES
 
 
W
OM
EN
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
EN
 
 
K
e
rn
e
l 
re
g
re
s
s
io
n
, 
b
w
 =
 _
_
0
0
0
0
0
F
, 
k
 =
 6
log(hourly wage rate)
A
p
p
ro
v
a
l 
o
f 
eq
u
a
l 
ri
g
h
ts
 (
%
)
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
3
3
.2
3
.4
3
.6
3
.84
K
er
n
el
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
, 
b
w
 =
 _
_
0
0
0
0
0
F
, 
k
 =
 6
log(hourly wage rate)
A
p
p
ro
v
al
 o
f 
eq
u
al
 r
ig
h
ts
 (
%
)
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
3
3
.2
3
.4
3
.6
3
.84
 
 
No
te:
 K
ern
el 
reg
res
sio
ns
 (g
au
ssi
an
 ke
rne
l).
  
So
ur
ce
: S
wi
ss 
La
bo
r F
orc
e S
urv
ey
, 1
99
1-2
00
3, 
ow
n c
alc
ula
tio
ns
. 
 TA
BL
E 
1 
AP
PR
OV
AL
 O
F E
QU
AL
 R
IG
HT
S A
ND
 LA
BO
R 
M
AR
KE
T 
OU
TC
OM
ES
, S
W
IT
ZE
RL
AN
D 
19
91
-20
03
 
DE
SC
RI
PT
IV
E 
ST
AT
IS
TI
CS
 
 
  
 
Lo
g (
wa
ge
 ra
te)
 
 
Ye
ars
 of
 sc
ho
oli
ng
 
 
Ye
ars
 of
 ac
tua
l e
xp
eri
en
ce
 
 
Ye
ars
 of
 te
nu
re 
 
Ap
pro
va
l o
f e
qu
al 
rig
hts
 
low
 
hig
h 
low
 
hig
h 
low
 
hig
h 
low
 
hig
h 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
om
en
 
3.2
48
 
3.3
60
 
11
.73
6 
12
.17
0 
11
.99
1 
12
.62
9 
6.6
52
 
6.9
88
 
 
 
{2
11
86
} 
{3
27
48
} 
{2
11
86
} 
{3
27
48
} 
{2
11
86
} 
{3
27
48
} 
{2
11
86
} 
{3
27
48
} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
en
 
3.5
98
 
3.6
37
 
12
.76
8 
13
.14
8 
20
.02
8 
18
.86
6 
10
.38
8 
10
.05
4 
 
 
{2
72
86
} 
{3
66
58
} 
{2
72
86
} 
{3
66
58
} 
{2
72
86
} 
{3
66
58
} 
{2
72
86
} 
{3
66
58
} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ge
nd
er 
ga
p (
wo
me
n-m
en
) 
-0.
34
9 
-0.
27
7 
-1.
03
2 
-0.
97
8 
-8.
03
7 
-6.
23
7 
-3.
73
7 
-3.
06
6 
 
 
(0.
00
5) 
(0.
00
4) 
(0.
02
0) 
(0.
02
1) 
(0.
10
5) 
(0.
09
1) 
(0.
08
1) 
(0.
06
7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Di
ffe
ren
ce
-in
-di
ffe
ren
ce
  
 
0.0
72
 
 
0.0
54
 
 
1.8
00
 
 
0.6
71
 
    
 (h
igh
-lo
w)
 
 
(0.
00
6)*
**
 
 
(0.
02
9)*
 
 
(0.
13
9)*
**
 
 
(0.
10
5)*
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No
tes
: W
eig
hte
d (
by
 th
e i
nv
ers
e o
f t
he
 sa
mp
lin
g p
rob
ab
ilit
y) 
me
an
s. 
Sta
nd
ard
 er
ror
s i
n p
are
nth
ese
s, 
nu
mb
er 
of 
ob
ser
va
tio
ns
 in
 cu
rly
 br
ac
ke
ts.
 
* s
ign
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
10
%;
 **
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
5%
; *
**
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
1%
. 
So
ur
ce
: S
wi
ss 
La
bo
r F
orc
e S
urv
ey
, 1
99
1-2
00
3, 
ow
n c
alc
ula
tio
ns
. 
 
 
 TA
BL
E 
2 
AP
PR
OV
AL
 O
F E
QU
AL
 R
IG
HT
S A
ND
 LA
BO
R 
M
AR
KE
T 
OU
TC
OM
ES
, S
W
IT
ZE
RL
AN
D 
19
91
-20
03
 
PA
RT
IA
L 
CO
RR
EL
AT
IO
NS
 
 
   
Lo
g (
wa
ge
 ra
te)
 
 
Ye
ars
 of
 sc
ho
oli
ng
 
 
Ye
ars
 of
 ac
tua
l 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
Ye
ars
 of
 te
nu
re 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fe
ma
le 
-0.
13
8 
-0.
95
0 
-4.
82
8 
-2.
16
4 
 
 
(0.
00
6)*
**
 
(0.
03
9)*
**
 
(0.
21
8)*
**
 
(0.
12
0)*
**
 
Ap
pro
va
l o
f e
qu
al 
rig
hts
a  
0.0
35
 
0.2
96
 
-0.
01
2 
0.0
78
 
 
 
(0.
00
6)*
**
 
(0.
04
5)*
**
 
(0.
16
3) 
(0.
11
5) 
Fe
ma
le 
* a
pp
rov
al 
of 
eq
ua
l r
igh
ts 
0.0
24
 
0.0
08
 
0.8
64
 
0.3
92
 
 
 
(0.
00
6)*
**
 
(0.
03
6) 
(0.
17
5)*
**
 
(0.
12
0)*
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ind
ivi
du
al 
ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ob
ser
va
tio
ns
 
11
78
78
 
11
78
78
 
11
78
78
 
11
78
78
 
R-
sq
ua
red
 
0.3
0 
0.0
7 
0.1
5 
0.0
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No
tes
: W
eig
hte
d 
(by
 th
e 
inv
ers
e 
of 
the
 sa
mp
lin
g 
pro
ba
bil
ity
) o
rdi
na
ry 
lea
st 
sq
ua
res
 e
sti
ma
tio
ns
. R
ob
us
t s
tan
da
rd 
err
ors
 in
 p
are
nth
ese
s 
(ad
jus
ted
 
for
 
clu
ste
rin
g 
wi
thi
n 
co
mm
un
itie
s).
 
* 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
10
%;
 
**
 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
5%
; 
**
* 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
1%
. 
a  T
he
 a
pp
rov
al 
rat
e 
of 
the
 e
qu
al 
rig
hts
 a
me
nd
me
nt 
is 
sta
nd
ard
ize
d 
wi
th 
a 
me
an
 o
f 
ze
ro 
an
d 
sta
nd
ard
 d
ev
iat
ion
 e
qu
al 
to 
on
e. 
 
Ind
ivi
du
al 
ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s a
re:
 ye
ars
 of
 sc
ho
oli
ng
, y
ea
rs 
of 
ac
tua
l e
xp
eri
en
ce
 (a
nd
 it
s s
qu
are
), 
ye
ars
 of
 te
nu
re 
(an
d i
ts 
sq
ua
re)
, n
ati
on
ali
ty,
 
ma
rti
al 
sta
tus
, p
art
-ti
me
 em
plo
ym
en
t s
tat
us
, c
an
ton
 an
d 
tim
e d
um
mi
es 
for
 re
su
lts
 re
ga
rdi
ng
 th
e w
ag
e r
ate
. Y
ea
rs 
of 
sch
oo
lin
g, 
ye
ars
 o
f 
ac
tua
l e
xp
eri
en
ce
, a
nd
 ye
ars
 of
 te
nu
re 
are
 om
itte
d f
rom
 th
e t
hre
e r
em
ain
ing
 es
tim
ate
s. 
 
So
ur
ce
: S
wi
ss 
La
bo
r F
orc
e S
urv
ey
, 1
99
1-2
00
3, 
ow
n c
alc
ula
tio
ns
. 
 
 
 TA
BL
E 
3 
AP
PR
OV
AL
 O
F E
QU
AL
 R
IG
HT
S A
ND
 W
AG
ES
, S
W
IT
ZE
RL
AN
D 
19
91
-20
03
 
PA
RT
IA
L 
CO
RR
EL
AT
IO
NS
 FO
R 
FO
UR
 SU
B-
SA
M
PL
ES
 
 
 
 
Po
pu
lat
ion
 in
 C
om
mu
nit
y 
 
Co
ho
rts
 bo
rn 
 
Se
rvi
ce
s 
 
 
les
s t
ha
n 2
0,0
00
 g
rea
ter
 th
an
 20
,00
0 
 
be
for
e 1
96
0 
aft
er 
19
60
 
 
Pr
iva
te 
Se
cto
r 
Pu
bli
c S
ec
tor
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fe
ma
le 
-0.
14
9 
-0.
13
5 
 
-0.
22
8 
-0.
09
1 
 
-0.
14
9 
-0.
06
3 
 
(0.
00
8)*
**
 
(0.
01
2)*
**
 
 
(0.
01
2)*
**
 
(0.
00
7)*
**
 
 
(0.
00
7)*
**
 
(0.
02
1)*
**
 
Ap
pro
va
l o
f e
qu
al 
0.0
39
 
0.0
25
 
 
0.0
4 
0.0
26
 
 
0.0
11
 
0.0
17
 
    
 ri
gh
tsa
 
(0.
00
6)*
**
 
(0.
01
2)*
* 
 
(0.
00
8)*
**
 
(0.
00
6)*
**
 
 
(0.
00
7) 
(0.
01
4) 
Fe
ma
le 
* a
pp
rov
al 
 
0.0
11
 
0.0
41
 
 
0.0
38
 
0.0
15
 
 
0.0
32
 
0.0
00
 
    
 of
 eq
ua
l r
igh
ts 
(0.
00
6)*
 
(0.
01
2)*
**
 
 
(0.
00
9)*
**
 
(0.
00
6)*
* 
 
(0.
00
8)*
**
 
(0.
01
7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ind
ivi
du
al 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
    
 ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s 
 
 
 
 
Ob
ser
va
tio
ns
 
76
18
5 
41
69
3 
 
58
39
6 
59
48
2 
 
72
60
9 
12
90
4 
R-
sq
ua
red
 
0.3
1 
0.2
9 
 
0.2
8 
0.2
9 
 
0.3
1 
0.2
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No
tes
: W
eig
hte
d (
by
 th
e i
nv
ers
e o
f t
he
 sa
mp
lin
g p
rob
ab
ilit
y) 
ord
ina
ry 
lea
st 
sq
ua
res
 es
tim
ati
on
s. 
Ro
bu
st 
sta
nd
ard
 er
ror
s i
n p
are
nth
ese
s (
ad
jus
ted
 
    
 fo
r c
lus
ter
ing
 w
ith
in 
co
mm
un
itie
s).
 * 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
at 
10
%;
 **
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
5%
; *
**
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
1%
. 
    
 a  T
he
 ap
pro
va
l r
ate
 of
 th
e e
qu
al 
rig
hts
 am
en
dm
en
t is
 st
an
da
rdi
ze
d w
ith
 a 
me
an
 of
 ze
ro 
an
d s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n e
qu
al 
to 
on
e. 
 
    
 In
div
idu
al 
ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s a
re:
 ye
ars
 of
 sc
ho
oli
ng
, y
ea
rs 
of 
ac
tua
l e
xp
eri
en
ce
 (a
nd
 its
 sq
ua
re)
, y
ea
rs 
of 
ten
ure
 (a
nd
 its
 sq
ua
re)
, n
ati
on
ali
ty,
 
    
 m
art
ial
 st
atu
s, 
pa
rt-
tim
e e
mp
loy
me
nt 
sta
tus
, c
an
ton
 an
d t
im
e d
um
mi
es 
for
 re
su
lts
 re
ga
rdi
ng
 th
e w
ag
e r
ate
. 
So
ur
ce
: S
wi
ss 
La
bo
r F
orc
e S
urv
ey
, 1
99
1-2
00
3, 
ow
n c
alc
ula
tio
ns
. 
  
 TA
BL
E 
4 
AP
PR
OV
AL
 O
F E
QU
AL
 R
IG
HT
S A
ND
 W
OM
EN
’S 
SU
BJ
EC
TI
VE
 W
EL
L-B
EI
NG
, S
W
IT
ZE
RL
AN
D 
19
99
-20
01
 
DE
SC
RI
PT
IV
E 
ST
AT
IS
TI
CS
 
 
  
 
 
Sa
tis
fac
tio
n w
ith
 lif
e 
   
Jo
b s
ati
sfa
cti
on
 
   
 
Fe
eli
ng
 th
at 
wo
me
n a
re 
pe
na
liz
ed
 
(co
mp
are
d t
o m
en
) 
 
Fe
eli
ng
 pe
rso
na
lly
 
pe
na
liz
ed
 (c
om
pa
red
 to
 
the
 op
po
sit
e s
ex
) 
 
Ap
pro
va
l o
f e
qu
al 
rig
hts
 
low
 
hig
h 
low
 
hig
h 
low
 
hig
h 
low
 
hig
h 
W
om
en
 
8.2
43
 
7.9
62
 
8.2
27
 
8.0
76
 
5.4
99
 
6.1
68
 
2.0
65
 
2.5
76
 
 
 
{1
49
4}
 
{1
96
5}
 
{8
49
} 
{1
09
1}
 
{1
47
3}
 
{1
94
6}
 
{1
48
9}
 
{1
95
5}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
en
 
8.1
32
 
7.9
51
 
8.1
11
 
7.9
81
 
5.2
05
 
5.5
41
 
0.4
52
 
0.5
86
 
 
 
{1
68
1}
 
{1
94
1}
 
{9
57
} 
{1
08
0}
 
{1
67
5}
 
{1
91
9}
 
{1
63
8}
 
{1
89
4}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ge
nd
er 
ga
p (
wo
me
n-
me
n)
 
0.1
11
 
0.0
11
 
0.1
17
 
0.0
96
 
0.2
94
 
0.6
27
 
1.6
13
 
1.9
91
 
 
 
(0.
04
7)*
* 
(0.
04
6) 
(0.
07
9) 
(0.
07
6) 
(0.
09
2)*
**
 
(0.
08
5)*
**
 
(0.
07
6)*
**
 
(0.
07
9)*
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Di
ffe
ren
ce
-in
-di
ffe
ren
ce
 
 
-0.
10
0 
 
-0.
02
1 
 
0.3
33
 
 
0.3
78
 
    
 (h
igh
-lo
w)
 
 
(0.
06
6) 
 
(0.
11
0) 
 
(0.
12
6)*
**
 
 
(0.
11
2)*
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No
tes
: S
tan
da
rd 
err
ors
 in
 pa
ren
the
ses
, n
um
be
r o
f o
bs
erv
ati
on
s i
n c
url
y b
rac
ke
ts.
 Sa
mp
le 
is 
res
tri
cte
d t
o s
ala
rie
d w
ork
ers
. *
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
10
%;
 
**
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
5%
; *
**
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
1%
. 
So
ur
ce
: S
wi
ss 
Ho
us
eh
old
 Pa
ne
l, o
wn
 ca
lcu
lat
ion
s. 
 
 TA
BL
E 
5 
AP
PR
OV
AL
 O
F E
QU
AL
 R
IG
HT
S A
ND
 W
OM
EN
’S 
SU
BJ
EC
TI
VE
 W
EL
L-B
EI
NG
, S
W
IT
ZE
RL
AN
D 
19
99
-20
01
 
PA
RT
IA
L 
CO
RR
EL
AT
IO
NS
 
 
   
Sa
tis
fac
tio
n w
ith
 lif
e 
   
Jo
b s
ati
sfa
cti
on
 
   
 
Fe
eli
ng
 th
at 
wo
me
n 
are
 pe
na
liz
ed
 
(co
mp
are
d t
o m
en
) 
 
Fe
eli
ng
 pe
rso
na
lly
 
pe
na
liz
ed
 (c
om
pa
red
 
to 
the
 op
po
sit
e s
ex
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fe
ma
le 
0.1
54
 
0.1
60
 
0.4
20
 
1.7
82
 
 
 
(0.
04
8)*
**
 
(0.
07
8)*
* 
(0.
09
6)*
**
 
(0.
09
2)*
**
 
Ap
pro
va
l o
f e
qu
al 
rig
hts
a  
-0.
00
5 
-0.
04
2 
0.0
55
 
-0.
05
 
 
 
(0.
03
2) 
(0.
04
7) 
(0.
05
8) 
(0.
03
5) 
Fe
ma
le 
* a
pp
rov
al 
of 
eq
ua
l r
igh
ts 
-0.
09
5 
-0.
09
0 
0.1
45
 
0.2
25
 
 
 
(0.
03
8)*
* 
(0.
06
1) 
(0.
07
9)*
 
(0.
07
3)*
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ind
ivi
du
al 
ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ob
ser
va
tio
ns
 
62
24
 
32
65
 
61
70
 
61
34
 
R-
sq
ua
red
 
0.0
6 
0.0
4 
0.0
6 
0.1
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No
tes
: O
rdi
na
ry 
lea
st 
sq
ua
res
 es
tim
ati
on
s. 
Sa
mp
le 
is 
res
tri
cte
d t
o s
ala
rie
d w
ork
ers
. R
ob
us
t s
tan
da
rd 
err
ors
 in
 pa
ren
the
ses
 (a
dju
ste
d f
or 
clu
ste
rin
g w
ith
in 
co
mm
un
itie
s).
 a  T
he
 ap
pro
va
l r
ate
 of
 th
e e
qu
al 
rig
hts
 am
en
dm
en
t is
 st
an
da
rdi
ze
d w
ith
 a 
me
an
 of
 ze
ro 
an
d s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n e
qu
al 
to 
on
e. 
* s
ign
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
10
%;
 **
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
5%
; *
**
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
at 
1%
. 
So
ur
ce
: S
wi
ss 
Ho
us
eh
old
 Pa
ne
l, o
wn
 ca
lcu
lat
ion
s. 
   
 Appendix 
 
TABLE A.1 
APPROVAL OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND WAGES, SWITZERLAND 1991-2003 
 
Dependent variable: log (hourly wage rate) 
Female -0.138 
 (0.006)*** 
Approval of equal rightsa 0.035 
 (0.006)*** 
Female * approval of equal rights 0.024 
 (0.006)*** 
Schooling (in years) 0.070 
 (0.002)*** 
Work experience (in years) 0.024 
 (0.001)*** 
Work experience squared / 100 -0.040 
 (0.002)*** 
Tenure (in years) 0.012 
 (0.001)*** 
Tenure squared / 100 -0.020 
 (0.002)*** 
Non-Swiss -0.098 
 (0.007)*** 
Married 0.080 
 (0.006)*** 
Part-time -0.043 
 (0.008)*** 
Canton effects Yes 
Year effects Yes 
Observations 117878 
R-squared 0.30 
Notes: a The approval rate of the equal rights amendment is 
standardized with a mean of zero and standard deviation equal to 
one. Results are not shown for year dummy, dummies indicating 
that work income or the level of education is not known and 
dummies for interview language. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within 
communities. 
Source: Swiss Labor Force Survey, own calculations. 
 
 
 TABLE A.2 
APPROVAL OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND LIFE SATISFACTION, SWITZERLAND 2000-2001 
 
Dependent variable: satisfaction with life 
 
 OLS Ordered Probit 
 Coef. Robust s.e. Coef. Robust s.e. 
Female 0.154 0.048 0.137 0.037 
Approval of equal rightsa -0.005 0.032 -0.005 0.025 
Female * approval of equal 
     rights -0.095 0.038 -0.069 0.029 
Age -0.079 0.013 -0.065 0.011 
Age squ. / 100 0.095 0.016 0.080 0.013 
Compulsory schooling Reference group 
Incomplete compulsory 
schooling -0.117 0.649 0.115 0.403 
Apprenticeship 0.115 0.082 0.052 0.061 
Maturity / High school 0.165 0.090 0.082 0.070 
Vocational high school 0.234 0.096 0.139 0.075 
University of applied sciences 0.252 0.111 0.143 0.086 
University 0.249 0.087 0.140 0.067 
Single Reference group 
Married 0.297 0.067 0.246 0.055 
Separated -0.381 0.198 -0.239 0.142 
Divorced -0.220 0.101 -0.136 0.075 
Widowed 0.000 0.199 -0.005 0.170 
National Reference group 
Foreigner -0.364 0.067 -0.262 0.051 
Full-time employment Reference group 
Part-time employment -0.079 0.060 -0.059 0.045 
Household income contributed  
   by other household members 
0.009 
 
0.005 
 
0.006 
 
0.004 
 
Household size, square root 0.063 0.065 0.047 0.052 
Constant 9.227 0.273   
Number of observations   6996    6996  
R-squared / Pseudo R-squared 0.06  0.02  
Notes: a The approval rate of the equal rights amendment is standardized with a mean of zero and 
standard deviation equal to one. Results are not shown for year dummy, dummies indicating 
that work income or the level of education is not known and dummies for interview language. 
Source: Swiss Household Panel, own calculations. 
 
 
